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CELEBRATING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE VIRTUES OF ITS VICES
AND VICE VERSA
GORDON B. BALDWIN*
The lavish prose marking our celebration of the Constitution
would be more convincing if it were tempered by more realism
and by public recognition that the Constitution has faults, as
well as virtues. The Constitution is not the Statue of Liberty;
it was crafted by politicians, not artists, and hence its faults
are more evident. Those faults are, in part, a result of timing.
The sparsely written 18th century document was conceived
during a torridly hot Philadelphia summer by men who did
not foresee the Industrial Revolution, the internal combustion
engine, or progressive income taxation. No one seriously ex-
pected the nation to extend soon to the Pacific Ocean. The
constitutional framers wrote a document for a small govern-
ment in a small society. The year 1787 was an inauspicious
time to frame a government for what would become the most
powerful nation on earth.
Realists, therefore, smile as others in this 200th anniver-
sary of the Constitution invoke rhetoric of the sort which has
flourished from our beginnings. For example, Justice William
Johnson observed in 1823 that the Constitution of the United
States was "the most wonderful instrument ever drawn by the
hand of man." 1 It has, he said, "a comprehension and preci-
sion of language that is unparalleled."'2
Justice Johnson's words are echoed by the British Prime
Minister and rhetorician William Gladstone, who in 1878
compared the constitutions of Great Britain and the United
States and contrasted the long gestation of the British system
with the American Constitution which was the product of a
single episode. Surely admirers of Mozart, Shakespeare and
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. Elkinson v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366). Justice Johnson
struck down a South Carolina law enslaving free blacks who entered the state. He
relied on dormant commerce clause grounds a year before Webster asserted the argu-
ment in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2. Elkinson, 8 F. Cas. at 493.
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Michelangelo will not agree that the Constitution of the
United States is "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a
given time by the brain and purpose of man."' 3 Gladstone's
words taken out of their context are silly.
The hyperbole of the English philosopher-mathematician
Alfred North Whitehead is more specific: "I know of only
two occasions in history when the people in power did what
needed to be done about as well as you can imagine its being
possible. One was the framing of your American Constitu-
tion."' 4  (The other example was the reign of Augustus
Caesar).
The vision of the Constitution as a holy writ is common-
place. The first Justice, John Marshall Harlan, is depicted as
going to bed "every night with one hand on the Constitution
and the other on the Bible,"' 5 an awkward sleeping posture
which perhaps contributed to some curious, but still viable,
decisions enforcing Biblical injunctions regarding the keeping
of the Sabbath.6 The Constitution does not guarantee wisdom
in the Supreme Court.
The constitutional defects we see today differ only in part
from those seen by contemporaries, although one must be sen-
sitive to the fact that one who picks faults in the Constitution
identifies his own preconceptions: "[W]here one comes out on
a case depends on where one goes in. ' ' The faults I cite may
be virtues to others, and vice versa.
For nearly 150 years there has been a debate as to whether
the Constitution allowed national legislation over economic
matters. Reasonable men, such as Jefferson, thought the Con-
stitution did not authorize the national government to create a
bank. Hamilton, and more importantly Chief Justice John
3. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, 127 N. AM. REV. 179, 185 (1878). Gladstone's
remarks are put in their proper context in M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD
Go OF ITSELF 162-63 (1986).
4. Landau, A Self-Correcting System .... 11 THIS CONST., at 4 (Summer 1986).
5. P. FREUND, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xxxix (4th ed. 1977) (described
by Justice Brewer).
6. Justice Harlan wrote for the Court in upholding a state law forbidding freight
trains from running on Sunday in Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896). That
decision has not been overruled and was cited as upholding a secular regulation in Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437 (1961).
7. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Marshall, disagreed.8 Madison, who had as much responsibil-
ity as any for the Constitution's text, concluded when he was
president that it did not authorize the federal government to
build roads or bridges.9 Not until 1942 did the Supreme
Court assure us finally that the Constitution enabled the na-
tional government to legislate on national economic
problems.' 0
The vices Thomas Jefferson perceived in the 1787 Consti-
tution reflected his republican biases. In addition to the fail-
ure to include a bill of rights, several faults he identified
remain troublesome issues today. Jefferson feared that presi-
dents might be reelected for life, a concern that in due course
inspired the twenty-second amendment. Jefferson's fear of a
monarchial presidency was deeply rooted in his philosophy, as
well as in his observations about contemporary monarchs who
for the most part, he said, were incompetents, fools or "really
crazy" - all qualities he claimed were accentuated by exces-
sive inbreeding." Whatever the faults of modern presidents,
there is no evidence that they are attributable to inbreeding.
Jefferson was also troubled by the failure of the Constitu-
tion to guarantee the writ of habeas corpus. The scope of the
writ is defined by Congress and not by the Constitution as
Jefferson wished. 12 He warned that Congress could limit the
scope of the writ,' 3 although it evidently did not occur to Jef-
ferson that the Supreme Court might also confine the great
writ. 14 The framers' debated decision not to emphasize guar-
antees of personal liberty conformed to their chief goal, which
was only to create the outline of a national government.' 5
Their decision not to include a bill of rights was soon repaired.
Their decision not to impose more detailed substantive limits
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
9. 1 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584-85 (1908)
(Madison's Veto of Internal Improvement Bill (1817)).
10. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
11. T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1221 (M. Peterson ed. 1984) (letter of March 5,
1810, to Governor John Langdon).
12. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 23, 30 (1807).
13. See T. JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 72.
14. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
15. The Convention briefly debated including a guarantee of the writ of habeas
corpus on August 28, 1787. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 438 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS].
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on state governments was not repaired until after a bloody
civil war.
Jefferson wisely saw that the Constitution's grant of effec-
tive life tenure to federal judges created an awkward problem.
While he approved giving the judiciary independence from the
executive branches, he worried that it would be nearly impos-
sible to remove a truly bad judge because of the difficulty in
impeaching and convicting. 16 The recent difficulty and delay
in removing Judge Claiborne of Nevada confirms those fears.
At present, there is no fair and effective method for removing
inadequate federal judges.
Jefferson's other fears, such as his misgiving about grant-
ing the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in both "law and
fact," 7 and his objection to requiring all state and federal offi-
cials to bind themselves by oath or affirmation to support the
Constitution, proved groundless or trivial.18
After Jefferson's death, more fundamental criticism of the
Constitution was voiced by abolitionist critics, such as Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison, who referred to the Constitution as "a
covenant with death and an agreement with Hell."19 To
punctuate his distaste, Garrison publicly burned a copy in
1854. The abolitionist critics were justified in viewing the
Constitution as imperfect, but if the framers had not placated
the South by tolerating slavery, no Constitution could have
been drafted or ratified.20 For several generations slavery "di-
vided the American nation into two distinctive halves. ' ' 21 The
Supreme Court, in the infamous Dred Scott case, aggravated
our agonies by holding that the fifth amendment forbade Con-
gress from eliminating slavery from the territories.22 It took a
war and three amendments to begin repairing the framers'
failure to address race problems. The vices in the original
Constitution were surely as unavoidable as they were inevita-
16. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 74.
17. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 917 (letter to James Madison of Dec. 20, 1787,
expressing Jefferson's first comments on the Constitution).
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
19. M. KAMMEN, supra note 3, at 98.
20. 1 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 595-96 (discussions of July 12, 1787, recorded in
Madison's notes).
21. C. COLLIER & L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA - THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 138 (1986).
22. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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ble. Far-reaching limits on state powers such as the four-
teenth amendment would have been anathema to the nation in
1787.
Although the framers undoubtedly anticipated a growing
union, few of our early leaders expected the United States to
become a global leader with worldwide interests and responsi-
bilities. Hence, it is not surprising that the 1787 document ill
equips us to be a world power. George Kennan observed:
The sharp division of powers, which represented in the eyes
of the founding fathers the very cornerstone of the American
governmental system, already goes far to rule out the pri-
vacy, flexibility, promptness and incisiveness of decision and
action, which have marked the great imperial powers of the
past and which are generally considered necessary to the
conduct of an effective world policy by the rulers of a great
state.23
Kennan's comments mirror those of Lord Macaulay, who,
seeing the instability and fickleness of American policies in
1857, told an American friend, "your Constitution, sir, is all
sail and no anchor. ' ' 24 Lord Macaulay's point was sharpened
twenty-five years ago by Senator Fulbright, who wrote that
"for the existing requirements of American foreign policy we
have hobbled the President by too niggardly a grant of
power. '25
Kennan's opinion drew a sharp response from Eugene
Rostow, 26 but whether either is correct is not what is pertinent
to this essay. It is demonstrable that a successful United States
foreign policy requires cooperation between the President and
Congress, as well as the understanding, if not wholehearted
support, of the heterogeneous electorate. Presidents forget-
ting this fail in their constitutional duties and can find no sol-
ace in the fact that no other nation requires so much and so
widespread support in foreign affairs. No nation imposes a
barrier as formidable as requiring a two-thirds vote of an in-
23. G. KENNAN, THE CLOUD OF DANGER 4 (1977).
24. 2 G. TREVELYAN, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF LORD MACAULAY, 409-10
(1876) (letter of May 23, 1857).
25. Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century
Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2 (1961-62). But see Fulbright, Foreign Policy - Old
Myths and New Realities, 53 Ky. L.J. 13, 33 (1964).
26. See Rostow, Searchingfor Kennan's Grand Design, 87 YALE L.J. 1527 (1978).
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dependent senate, a requirement that means bipartisan sup-
port is essential for treaties, and which generates pressure for
alternative means of making international agreements.27
The framers deliberately chose to harness presidential ini-
tiatives, and we may honestly debate their wisdom. The Con-
vention rejected Roger Sherman's argument that the President
simply be the embodiment of legislative will, 8 but it is by no
means clear from either the text or from Madison's notes ex-
actly how much power in diplomatic matters the Constitution
actually allocates to the President. Plainly the Convention de-
cided to enlarge presidential powers only after it had struck a
balance between the interests of large and small states. The
senate was chosen to review treaties and presidential appoint-
ments because the small states were equally represented there.
The scope of presidential powers, however, remained vague.
The best summary of what the framers intended is offered by
one of the participants, Abraham Baldwin, of Georgia, who
wrote later that some foreign relations issues were deliberately
left unsettled in the hope that they would be resolved "by
practice or by amendments in the progress of the Govern-
ment."2 9 One of the virtues, or vices, of the Constitution is
that the shifting balance between congressional and presiden-
tial authority is attributable more to the personality and phi-
losophy of current leaders, and to the issues of the moment,
than to authoritative doctrine. It would be tragic if the consti-
tutional balance were established at a time when the President
was weak, and Congress strong, or vice versa. That balance
cannot be achieved by judicial rule-making.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has seized substantial
power to umpire presidential disputes with Congress. Despite
the textual uncertainty, some tendencies are clear in a handful
of decisions. The more an issue involves military strategy,
weapons deployment or defense plans, the more easily it is
argued that the President's exclusive power under article II as
"Commander-in-Chief" should prevail over the competing
legislative claims of Congress. However, when the issues in-
27. It remains debatable whether executive agreements can displace prior statutes.
See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) (wherein
the issue is cleverly avoided).
28. 1 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 65.
29. 3 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 370.
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volve money which must be appropriated by Congress, or reg-
ulations of foreign trade, the balance is less favorable to the
President. More often than not, the balance is struck by a
process of conciliation, accommodation and compromise,
without which the nation could not long endure. Judicial re-
view of the polar claims of the President and Congress in mat-
ters of foreign affairs is relatively, and happily, rare. A
judicial decision firmly and finally settling presidential or con-
gressional claims could have disastrous future consequences.
It is understandable that the decisions of the Supreme Court
in separation of powers claims involving foreign affairs are
delphic, ambiguous, and seldom supply predictable doctrine.3
The basic constitutional vice, however, is that separation of
powers issues are frequently found justiciable. Fortunately,
by and large the courts rule in favor of the President in critical
instances.
A favorite source for advocates of strong presidential
power is the Prize Cases of 1862.31 The Prize Cases involved
Lincoln's action to preserve federal rule in the South. Block-
ading ports and selling violating-vessels as prizes was consid-
ered a rational method of carrying on a war designed to coerce
the South. The holding of the case was expressed in alterna-
tives, and the strongest ground was surely the alternative rul-
ing of Justice Grier that Congress had subsequently ratified
the President's order to seize vessels under the law of war.32
Commentators still debate whether the decision supports a
presidential power to send forces into foreign combat without
congressional approval. Justice Douglas questioned their ap-
plication to justify military orders in the Vietnam conflict. 3
The Constitution's inadequate guidance is underlined in a
recent decision sustaining presidential powers, Dames &
Moore v. Regan.34 The Court, in an admittedly ad hoe deci-
sion, upheld an executive order suspending attachment orders
of federal courts.35 The Court declined to find any conflict
30. An example is Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
31. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
32. Id. at 698.
33. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Douglas and Stewart, J.J.,
dissenting).
34. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
35. Id.
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between the President and Congress.36 Instead, the Court
ruled that Congress had granted discretionary authority to the
President by implication.37 Except for the obvious foreign af-
fairs implications, it is hard to reconcile Dames & Moore with
the steel seizure dispute of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.38
Besides possessing discretionary power, the Court recog-
nizes that the President has an uncertain amount of absolute
power. One example lies in the executive privilege, a right not
specified in the Constitution but found by the Court as a nec-
essary implication. In United States v. Nixon,3 9 the Supreme
Court stressed seven times that it was not ruling on an execu-
tive privilege claim involving foreign affairs, clearly indicating
that executive privilege exists for some purposes. However,
the contours of that privilege are unclear. Presumably, an ex-
ecutive privilege, if found, is absolute and on a par with the
President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. All the Supreme
Court has said supports the argument that it is unlikely to find
courts supplying definitive answers to critical and enduring
constitutional questions involving foreign affairs.
The reluctance of courts to rule against the President on
foreign affairs issues is not as apparent when the issues are
domestic. 4° In this sphere, judicial power is less restrained.
Indeed, the most apparent vice, or virtue, of our Constitution
is in the ambiguities which invite interpretation, and, in a
proper case, judicial review. Although the framers are criti-
cized for failing to specify the reach of judicial power, some
judicial interpretations were expected. 4' Thomas Jefferson
predicted a judicial role in construing the Bill of Rights.42 He
recognized that constitutional debate is legal debate, and
36. Id. at 687-88.
37. Id. at 680, 686.
38. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
39. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
40. The prime example is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
41. 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 76 (almost casual observation by Luther Martin,
a fervent advocate of state claims, on July 21, 1787).
42. On March 15, 1789, Jefferson wrote James Madison to urge drafting a "decla-
ration of rights," and said, "in the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you
omit one which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands
of the judiciary." T. JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 943.
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therein lies the distinctive quality of American constitutional
law.
It is clear, however, that deep and fundamental political
issues are not, and cannot be, decided by the Supreme Court.
Our civil war is evidence of one constitutional debate fought
in part over an unresolved constitutional question, namely,
whether states were free to withdraw from the covenant. On
four occasions controversial decisions of the Supreme Court
have been displaced by constitutional amendments,4 3 and
others have been proposed from time to time to overturn other
decisions. Feverish debate centering on the role of the
Supreme Court interpreting the Constitution continues. The
British journal The Economist observed thirty years ago when
the Supreme Court decided to review President Truman's
seizure of the steel mills:
At the first sound of a new argument over the United States
Constitution and its interpretation the hearts of Americans
leap with a fearful joy. The blood stirs powerfully in their
veins and a new lustre brightens their eyes. Like King
Harry's men before Harfleur, they stand like greyhounds in
the slips, straining upon the start.'
That fascination with constitutional debate is costly be-
cause it tends to focus attention on the courts. Litigation with
its winner-take-all rules is a dangerous way of deciding close
and value-laden issues. Therein lies a vice in the Constitution.
However, reliance on the courts can also be a virtue because
courts do decide issues, and they function best when those is-
sues are truly put to rest. Professor Neal Komesar makes a
valuable contribution to constitutional discourse in pointing
out the institutional forces operating upon courts .4  The les-
son is plain - courts should perform only the jobs for which
they are fit and should abstain in other matters. The complex
43. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XI, displaced Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 16
(1793); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, overturned Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (allowing income tax), rejected Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (giving a vote to
those over eighteen), rejected Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (quoting American Survey: Steel Puts the Question, 163 THE
ECONOMIST, May 10, 1952, at 370).
45. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitu-
tional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. RaV. 366 (1984).
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doctrines of standing, political questions and justiciability can
and should help deliniate the proper judicial sphere.
DOES THE CONSTITUTION MAKE IT
IMPOSSIBLE TO GOVERN?
A constitution need not make it impossible to govern, as
the Emperor Frederick the Great found with the Prussian
Constitution. The Prussian document was quite satisfactory
for him. "My people and I," he said, "have come to an agree-
ment which satisfies us both. They are to say what they
please, and I am to do what I please."'46 The President of the
United States marches to a different tune. American presi-
dents have unique problems governing because of the separa-
tion of powers articulated in the Constitution.
"A particular shortcoming," says Lloyd Cutler, a princi-
pal aide to President Carter, "is the structural inability of our
government to propose, legislate and administer a balanced
program for governing."'47 Demonstrably, the Constitution
makes it more difficult to govern efficiently. A parliamentary
system does not distribute national power among three
branches so sharply as does our system.
Separation of powers encourages stalemates. The Presi-
dent is elected on the basis of a legislative program, but cannot
carry it out. The President is hobbled, says Cutler, because of
limited leverage over members of Congress to entice their sup-
port, the need for a two-thirds confirmation by the Senate of
treaties and for ambassadors, the significant need of bipartisan
support for essential legislation, and the difficulty in acting
quickly unless Congress has previously delegated broad pow-
ers.48 Moreover, Congress is likely to impose statutory condi-
tions that hobble presidential policies such as, for example,
banning military assistance to the Contras of Nicaragua or to
Turkey, opposing forces in Angola, and foreclosing foreign
aid because of human rights violations. Onerous conditions
placed on those receiving United States assistance is
traditional.
46. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 218 (3d ed. 1979).
47. Cutler, To Form A Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 126-27 (1980).
48. Id.
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Cutler vigorously proclaims that the virtues of the 1787
Constitution are vices two hundred years later. He notes that
different kinds of choices are now required. Today's choices
are more difficult because resources are no longer adequate. A
choice today leaves losers. In 1787, the nation enjoyed abun-
dant lands and the promise of an expanding economy. Losers
could migrate; they cannot today.49 Cutler further notes that
the world is interdependent in ways never anticipated. Eco-
nomic problems in Brazil, Japan and elsewhere affect the
United States too.5 0 Finally, changes in the relationship be-
tween the legislative and executive branches are aggravated by
size and quality. 1 Congress is no longer led by a few leaders.
Rather, legislative power is shared, the seniority system is
weak, and several committees are involved in nearly every bill.
There are public markup sessions, and huge staffs must be co-
ordinated. The decline in party discipline and importance of
interest groups make today's leadership infinitely more diffi-
cult than in 1787.
Examples of constitutional constructions making the busi-
ness of government more difficult are legion. The Supreme
Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, holding that Congress
lacked authority to designate officials to enforce the federal
elections law, wiped out a hard-bargained political compro-
mise.5 2 That decision rests on a rigid line between the func-
tions of the Executive and Congress. The Court, rightly or
wrongly, made political compromises difficult and cast doubt
on the power of Congress to insist that members serve on ex-
ecutive department trade delegations negotiating agreements
with foreign nations.
In July of 1983, citing the plain text of the Constitution,
the Court forbade Congress from retaining sole power to veto
executive agency rules.53 The Court struck down a useful
political device that had been used for more than fifty years,
49. Id. at 132-33.
50. Id. at 133-35.
51. Id. at 135-36.
52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
53. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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and thereby generated a wealth of legal business because of its
literal, if not mechanical, reading of the Constitution. 4
Using a similar definitional method, the Court in 1986
struck down another bargained compromise between the Pres-
ident and Congress which had been worked out in the
Gramm-Rudman Act.15 The Constitution requires that exec-
utive officers be appointed and removed by the President.5 6
The Comptroller General, concluded the Court, was too
much a creature of Congress to allow him to exercise execu-
tive budget functions. The Court, therefore, rejected the claim
that when the Constitution assigned Congress the power to
appropriate money it also gave Congress a choice of means.
The Court is doubtless correct in reading the Constitution
as establishing tension between the President and Congress,
but the methods employed in other separation of powers' deci-
sions support a more flexible and accommodating constitu-
tional interpretation. In Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services,57 the Court described the argument that each of the
government's departments are independent as "an archaic
view."' 58 The Court adopted a balancing approach in uphold-
ing congressional power to regulate the disposition of Presi-
dent Nixon's papers because the complex system of
regulations supplied adequate initial protection of the Presi-
dent's lawful authority. 9 In United States v. Nixon, the Court
employed a functional analysis in determining whether or not
the President was obliged to surrender materials required in a
criminal trial.6
The Court's failure to identify a single test in evaluating
separation of powers' claims has merit. Decision-makers find
it expedient to negotiate and compromise, because it is not
known which of the three approaches is correct - defini-
54. It remains vexing to determine whether an invalid legislative veto provision is
separable from the remaining portions of the statute, or is so linked to the other parts as
to make the whole statute void. See Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 55 U.S.L.W. 4396 (Mar.
25, 1987).
55. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
56. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
57. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
58. Id. at 443.
59. Id.
60. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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tional, functional or balancing. Whether this contributes to a
workable government is uncertain.
Justice Jackson was correct in observing that an overriding
purpose of the framers was to form a "workable govern-
ment."' 6 ' For the most part the inescapable tension among the
three branches has been managed through adoptions in the
political arena, rather than through refined judicial interpreta-
tion of the boundaries between the President and Congress.
Curiously, the Court is more reluctant now to rule on state
claims of immunity from federal regulation than to umpire
executive-legislative disputes. 2
Some issues susceptible to litigation remain deliberately
unresolved. What is, for example, the power of Congress to
require the executive branch to supply information necessary
for legislators? Courts have not yet defined the contours of
"executive privilege," nor is there a strong disposition to seek
such rulings. Both branches have managed to avoid litigation
since the confrontations involving the Nixon papers. 3
The value of this uncertainty in locating executive and
congressional boundaries was recognized many years ago by
Justice Brandeis, who observed:
The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency, but to pre-
clude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not
to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction inci-
dent to the distribution of governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy.'
The price of friction is high, as are the hazards of compro-
mise. Cutler, who had intensive experience as a presidential
aide working with congressional leaders, points out that com-
promises are not always desirable. "When the President gets
only half a loaf of his overall program, this half a loaf is not
necessarily better than none, because it may lack the essential
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
62. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
63. For additional discussion, see Baldwin, Congressional Power to Demand Disclo-
sure of Foreign Intelligence Agreements, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1 (1976); Baldwin,
The Foreign Affairs Advice Privilege, 1976 Wis. L. Rnv. 16.
64. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
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quality of balance. And half a loaf leaves both the President
and the public in the worst of all possible worlds."65
The constitutional solutions Cutler offers to cure the vices
he perceives may be worse than the disease he seeks to cure.
He proposes nothing less than nearly total revision of the Con-
stitution in seeking to bind presidents with Congress. He first
urges that a vote for President be linked with one's vote for
members of Congress. Voters would elect a team: President,
Vice President, Member of the House of Representatives, and
perhaps a Senator. Second, the President should be empow-
ered to select half his cabinet from Congress. Thus, the In-
compatibility of Office, and the Officers clauses would be
deleted from the Constitution. Third, the President should be
allowed to dissolve Congress and call for new congressional
elections (i.e., as in the French Constitution). Fourth, the
President's dissolving power should be equalized by a two-
thirds vote of Congress to call for a new presidential election.
Fifth, presidents should be elected to six-year terms.66
The scheme is elaborate. A President could dissolve Con-
gress once each term and call for new congressional elections
for the remainder of the term; Congress could, by majority
vote, call for simultaneous, new elections for President for the
remainder of the six year term. State primaries for these mid-
term elections would be held sixty days after the call, nomi-
nating conventions thirty days thereafter, and national elec-
tions sixty days after the state primaries. Thus, a new
government could be formed within a 120-day cycle. Cutler
would also reestablish a modified two-house legislative veto,
which could be overturned by a presidential veto, but the
Congress could reinstate its veto with a two-thirds override.
The Cutler proposals are, of course, farfetched and unreal-
istic. They are revealing only in emphasizing the frustrations
the Constitution fosters. They remind us that the Constitu-
tion endures more because of the labor of its servants rather
than because of the talent of eighteenth century gentlemen.
Its servants apply and interpret the Constitution wisely, and
foolishly. Statesmen, knaves, criminals, lawyers and profes-
sors are sustained by constitutional argument.
65. Cutler, supra note 47, at 138.
66. Id. at 139-43.
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A constitutional virtue is its implicit call upon people to
work together. Justice Holmes confirms the view that how we
build upon the Constitution is more significant than the words
of the document itself. In Missouri v. Holland,67 he observed:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent
act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must real-
ize that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or
to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood
to prove that they created a nation. 8
Holmes' words challenge Americans today. The Constitution
does not command or guarantee the rule of law. It only offers
opportunities to work together in a common venture. The
Constitution offers a framework for intelligent bargaining, it
does not guarantee wisdom.
What we must honor is not a document, but a process.
The nation flourishes as no other nation on the globe has, not
because of the Constitution, but because we try to honor its
premises and the procedures it establishes. The Constitution
possesses qualities that deserve celebration and justify the oath
we take to support it. Those qualities are its focus on proce-
dure, its invitation to political compromises, and its use of ba-
sic common law language and forms. The Constitution is not
a complete break with the past like the Napoleonic Code.
Much of the document's language is copied from colonial
charters and from British legal documents dating back to the
thirteenth century Magna Carta.
A PROCEDURAL DOCUMENT
First and foremost, the Constitution is a procedural docu-
ment. For the most part it establishes procedures stating how
the national government is organized, how laws are enacted
and how officials are chosen. In article I, the Constitution
states what Congress can do, what it cannot do, and addition-
ally lists some restrictions on state powers. The rough out-
lines of a criminal justice system are described by
67. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
68. Id. at 433.
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guaranteeing trials by jury; but only one crime, treason, is de-
fined. The document says very little about substantive rights.
American focus on procedure suggests a limited judicial
role, one that Justice Holmes fervently argued should permit
legislatures broad freedom to choose. Holmes was ninety-
three years old when he spoke sharply to Justice Stone.
"Young man," said Holmes to Stone, who was then sixty-one,
"about seventy-five years ago I learned that I was not God.
And so, when the people of the various states want to do
something I can't find anything in the Constitution expressly
forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not, 'God-
dammit, let 'em do it!' "69
Holmes understood that allowing the President and Con-
gress to "let 'em do it," unless expressly forbidden by the Con-
stitution, was not a license for tyrants. Presidents and
Congress are confined by Constitutional procedures. These
procedures are the direct result of compromises, and like most
compromises they are awkward. The President is selected in a
curious manner. The Senate represents each state equally re-
gardless of size and the number of inhabitants. The President
and Congress share war powers. The scope of Congress'
power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may, or may not, be plenary. The nature of the treaty
power is unclear. Both the state and national governments
may legislate on the same subject matter. Indeed, the Consti-
tution contains so many compromises that several of the most
vocal and influential delegates refused, at the end, to sign the
document.
OUR CONSTITUTION INVITES PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS
The United States is lucky that in 1787 the Framers were
practical men of affairs who knew business, banking and farm-
ing. They were wise, pragmatic, and seldom quarrelsome.
The keynote of the Constitutional Convention was expressed
by John Dickinson of Delaware: "Experience must be our
only guide. Reason may mislead us."' 70 The pragmatism of
the Framers liberated them from allegiance to Old World
69. C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 281 (1947).
70. 2 S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 246 (7th ed. 1980).
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forms of government, but their knowledge of history and poli-
tics anchored them to reality. They knew, but did not reflect
upon, the fact that their meeting was the first recorded in-
stance of freely chosen representatives of a people deliberately
and peacefully debating what form of government their coun-
try should adopt. As models to avoid and to emulate, the
Framers considered Greek, Roman and Dutch Republics, and
of course, the rich, instructive and bloody history of England.
BEWARE OF IDEOLOGUES
Perhaps Americans were fortunate that the Convention
did not include several renowned political thinkers. John Ad-
ams was in England; Thomas Jefferson, widely regarded as the
most enlightened, if not the most self-assured American of the
time, was in France. Neither played a role in shaping our fun-
damental law. One may muse that had Jefferson been in Phil-
adelphia the forces of pragmatism might have been
overwhelmed by Jefferson's logic, or that he and Adams
would have neutralized each other, and the Convention would
have dissolved in failure. If either Jefferson or Adams had
prevailed, we would have quite a different document today. It
is also fortunate that several of the most fervid hotheads of the
American Revolution were not in Philadelphia in 1787. The
advocacy and eloquence of Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams
might have produced a document establishing an even weaker
central government. The composition of the Convention
which resulted recalls the old quip, "God looks after fools,
drunkards and the United States. ' 71 Surely the fractious na-
tion had done little in the previous decade to deserve the col-
lection of talent assembled in 1787.
Luck must play some role in constitutional success. Many
other nations have adopted constitutions copied from ours but
have not managed to keep them working. Latin American
countries drew on the United States Constitution as well as
upon the rich experiences of Spain and Portugal, but no na-
tional constitution written in the nineteenth century survives
as an operative working document.72 Several nations have
copied our form, but with indifferent success. Iran, in 1906,
71. BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 1102b (E. Beck 14th ed. 1968).
72. Baldwin, The Legal System ofIran, 7 INT'L LAW 492 (1973).
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directed a system of judicial review by which selected clergy
would review acts of the legislature and measure whether they
were consistent with the Koran.73 No clergy were selected to
perform this task until 1980. Their judicial review rejects land
reform and women's civil rights, and restores divorce on the
demand of the male spouse. Italy and Germany, following
our example only in part, have special constitutional courts.
The United States is unusual in bestowing on ordinary courts
power to declare legislation unconstitutional. That we do
confer this power testifies to our confidence in judges and law-
yers - and to our belief that errors will be corrected promptly
on appeal.
GREAT JUDICIAL POWER
The Constitution's emphasis on procedure enhances judi-
cial power. Nothing in the Constitution or in the Framers'
debates, however, suggests the major role federal courts have
had in protecting civil liberties, umpiring separation of powers
disputes, or protecting the national common market. Courts
earned their distinctive role in two ways; first, by seizing it,
and second, by persuading that this seizure of judicial power
was justified. Whether or not the Supreme Court's decisions
are the "supreme law of the land" on a par with the Constitu-
tion is, as the Court once said, beside the point.74 We obey the
Court because the alternatives are worse. Tradition is a more
forceful teaching than the text of the Constitution, and our
constitutional traditions begin with the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Marshall leads the parade of creative Justices
who have established that the Constitution allows courts to
haul a presidential agent into court,75 and to displace the judg-
ment of legislators.76 Marshall was the first to rule that the
structure of the Constitution confers some immunity from
state law on federal programs.77 These seminal decisions have
only tenuous links to the text of the Constitution, but have
73. Id. at 500.
74. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).
76. Id.
77. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
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been persuasive nonetheless. The result in these cases deci-
sively shapes the constitutional law we struggle with today.
THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court is, more often than not, persuasive.
The great Marshall decisions have influenced constitutional
government more sharply than the Constitution itself. We are
also indebted to other phrasemakers: Justices Holmes, Bran-
deis and Jackson. Their prose captures attention, commands
support and inspires our allegiance. As we observe the Con-
stitution's bicentennial, let us particularly mark the people
who make representative government work - the lawyers,
judges, politicians, statesmen and soldiers who have devoted
themselves to it. Their work is our legacy, and their labors
deserve our esteem.

